

S.T

18 DEC 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant for Coordination/DCI

SUBJECT: Clandestine Collection of S&T Intelligence

1. Scientific and technical intelligence has been increasingly recognized as of the highest priority National importance in the Priority National Intelligence Objectives and elsewhere. It is a major input to estimates not only on the present capabilities of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to undertake military action or peaceful "penetration by technical aid" but also is, in this technological age, the primary factor in estimating future Bloc postures and threats.

2. The information most necessary to meet the highest priority scientific intelligence objectives lies in the time stage between the openly disseminated results of theoretical and basic research and those technological achievements which have already reached advanced testing, production and deployment stages. This vital gap, in short, is that information on the policy, planning, research and design stages of technological achievements which is fundamental to the S&T intelligence community's major responsibility to forecast the forms of future weapons systems at a sufficiently early stage to permit the development of adequate U. S. countermeasures on a timely basis.

3. The information necessary to fill this vital gap will never be available from any overt materials or sources, technical collection devices, reconnaissance missions or casual contacts between Bloc and Western scientists. Clandestine Services efforts to date have produced information acquired principally on ad hoc bases


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These types of clandestine collection have provided information either on the overt aspects of basic science or on specific military systems in, or close to, the production and deployment stages. As a result of such Clandestine

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Services reporting, our intelligence always will be trying to catch up rather than looking ahead to anticipated Soviet developments in advanced weapons systems. Therefore, it is our firm conviction that this most vital gap concerning the threat of future Sino-Soviet strategic programs and weapons systems must receive highest priority effort, and we further believe that it can be filled only by clandestine operations resulting in reporting from internal agent assets knowledgeable of or having direct access to this normally inaccessible data on policy, planning, research and design.

4. It is recognized that precise identification of valid Sino-Soviet target personalities (and their organizations) and means of access to them must be achieved before the development of such internal assets can be effectively pursued. Such analyses can come only from the analytical or intelligence producing elements, such as the Office of Scientific Intelligence working in close collaboration with the Clandestine Services. This task, however, is more difficult than might first appear because of (1) frequently inadequate information to arrive at such precise findings, and (2) a natural reluctance to undertake such time consuming studies in the absence of firm policy guaranteeing coordinated and concerted use by the Clandestine Services of such analytical undertakings. Therefore, also essential to the development of a capability for effective collecting of that information vital to our needs is (1) a policy determination to develop a program with which to task individual Clandestine Services components in an orchestrated worldwide collection effort, (2) a concomitant specific dedication of Clandestine Services manpower resources to the performance of assigned tasks, and (3) such changes within the DD/P command structure and the acquisition of such technically qualified personnel as may be necessary to the effective performance of those S&T tasks.


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